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JUDITH V. ROYSTER*

Indian Water and the Federal Trust:
Some Proposals for Federal Action
ABSTRACT
Indian tribal reserved rights to water constitute trust assets
under the protection of the federal government. Nonetheless, the
federal government's duty of protection, and remedies against the
government if it fails in that duty, are seldom recognized by law.
Congress could protect tribal water rights through enactment of
comprehensive regulatory legislation, but such legislation would
run counter to the modern trend of recognizing increasing tribal
control over natural resources and would interfere with tribes'
authority to manage their water. There are, however, a number of
steps that Congress and the Department of the Interior could take
in fulfillment of the federal trust responsibilityfor Indian water
rights. These proposals, briefly outlined here, would assist tribes
with the development and management of their water resources
and remove obstacles to tribalauthority over water that presently
exist in federal law.
I. WATER RIGHTS AND THE TRUST CORPUS
There can be no doubt that tribal water rights form part of the
trust corpus protected by the federal-tribal trust relationship. Water
rights are federal rights impliedly reserved by the federal government
for the tribes when Indian country' was established; as such, they are
trust assets as much as the land itself 2 or constituent elements of the land
such as timber and minerals. 3 Water rights settlement acts routinely
*
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Indian Law Center, and the Natural Resources Journal for sponsoring the April 2005
symposium: Moving Beyond the Current Paradigm: Redefining the Federal-Tribal Trust
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1. Indian country is defined by statute as including all lands within reservations,
dependent Indian communities, and trust and restricted allotments located off-reservation.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). It is defined by common law as lands set aside for the use of
Indians under the superintendence of the federal government. See, e.g., United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 (1978); see also COH4EN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04,

at 182-2000 (Nell Jessup Newton et a. eds., 2005).
2. Most tribal lands today are held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the
governing tribe or tribes. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 15.03, at 967-69.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116-18 (1938).
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recognize this status by asserting that the tribal water resources at issue
are held in trust for the tribes by the United States.4 Moreover, water
rights represent valuable property rights, and tribal interests in property
are protected by federal law against alienation and encumbrance without
federal consent.5
The political branches of the federal government -those charged
by the Constitution with the development and conduct of Indian affairs
policy 6 -have explicitly recognized the federal trust responsibility for
tribal water rights. In the Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992,
Congress expressly found that "the Federal Government recognizes its
trust responsibilities to protect Indian water rights and assist Tribes in
the wise use of those resources." 7 The Department of the Interior has
concurred. For example, in its criteria and procedures for participation in
tribal water rights settlements, the Department states that "Indian water
rights are vested property rights for which the United States has a trust
responsibility, with the United States holding legal title to such water in
8
trust for the benefit of the Indians."
Judicial decisions have substantially supported the position of
the political branches. In the well-known water rights case Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton,9 the district court relied on the Interior
Department's "fiduciary duty" to tribes relative to their water rights in
striking down the Secretary's allocation of excess water in the Truckee
River. More directly, the claims court held in 1991 that "title to [tribal]
water rights constitutes the trust property, or the res, which the
government, as trustee, has a duty to preserve." 10 The year before,
however, the same court held that allottees' water rights did not

4. See Gila River Indian Cmty. Water Rights Settlement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108451, tit. H, § 204(a)(2), 118 Stat. 3478, 3502; Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-447, tit. X, § 7(a)(1)(A), 118 Stat. 2809, 3434; Confederated Tribes of the Warm
Springs Reservation Water Rights Settlement Agreement, 1997, art. V, § B, approved by Pub.
L. No. 107-102, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 974.
5. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
6. The Constitution places the primary power for Indian affairs and Indian policy
with Congress by way of the Indian Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Indian affairs authority is also located in the treaty clause, investing both the President and
the Senate with authority. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200
(2004).
7. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102575, § 3002(9), 106 Stat. 4600, 4695 (codified by reference at 43 U.S.C. § 371 (2000)).
8. Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; Criteria and Procedures for the
Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement of Indian Water
Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Working Group].
9. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
10. Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 417,426 (1991).
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constitute a trust corpus." The cases are readily distinguishable,
however, in part on the ground that the allottees in the earlier case had
12
factual control over their water rights.
The decisions affirming that tribal water rights are part of the
trust corpus and subject to federal fiduciary obligations represent the
better approach. Not only are those decisions consistent with the plain
statements of the political branches, but also with the development of the
implied reserved rights doctrine over the last century.
Tribal water rights arise by implication through interpretation of
the treaties, statutes, agreements, and executive orders creating Indian
country. 13 Nothing in those federal documents speaks expressly to water,
but the Supreme Court has held, ever since the foundational Winters
decision in 1908, that water was nonetheless reserved for the tribes. In
part, this reservation stems from the canons of construction, which in
turn are an expression of the federal trust obligation. The Indians, the
Court found, would not have agreed to settle on the reserved tract of
land without the water to make it livable. 14 And in part, the reservation
of water rights stems from the federal government's power to reserve
water from appropriation, a power that it impliedly exercised when it set
land aside in trust for the tribes.' 5
Tribal water rights are generally reserved for two broad
categories of purposes, both of which are grounded in the federal trust
responsibility. First, under the Winters doctrine, water is reserved by the
fact that land is reserved. 16 When lands were set aside for tribes, those
reservations were held in trust with a guarantee of tribal protection in
the lands. The guarantees necessarily carried with them a duty on the
part of the government to ensure tribal use and enjoyment. The
reservation of the water is, at least in part, a direct outgrowth of the
federal government's trust responsibility to protect tribes in their
reserved lands. As the Supreme Court noted in Winters, the reserved
lands would have little value without the water necessary to make the
17
reservation livable.
Second, water is also reserved as necessary to preserve
aboriginal practices that are intended to continue after the creation of
11. Grey v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 285 (1990), affd, 935 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
12. See Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L.
REv. 753,809-10 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546 (1963).
14. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
15. Id. at 577.
16. See id. at 576-78.
17. Id. at 576.
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reservations. In particular, the Court has held that a reservation of
traditional rights to fish necessarily implies those additional rights, such
18
as access to the fishing places, needed to give effect to the fishing rights.
Thus, if one purpose of a land reservation is the preservation of the
tribe's historic fishing rights, an instream flow necessary to maintain the
fishery is impliedly reserved as well.1 9 Water rights reserved to protect
and maintain tribal fisheries should not be confined to fishing places
within Indian country, but should extend to the tribes' traditional fishing
grounds. 20 The reservation of water to protect traditional uses is, at least
in part, a direct outgrowth of the federal government's trust responsibility to protect rights guaranteed to tribes in treaties and agreements.
The trust responsibility extends as well to federal representation
of tribes in water rights adjudications 21 and settlement negotiations, 22
and any judicial decision binding on the United States as trustee is also
binding on the represented tribes. 23 Nonetheless, there are substantial
difficulties with federal representation in adjudications. First, although
the federal government may institute suit on behalf of, and represent,
tribes, its decision to do so is discretionary. 24 Unless a treaty, agreement,
or statute provides otherwise, tribes cannot force the federal government
to bring water rights claims on their behalf. 25
Second, if the federal government does assume the responsibility
of representing tribes in water rights adjudications, it has inherent
conflicts of interest. 26 In general stream adjudications, 27 the federal
government is responsible for representing not only the interests of the
18. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
19. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
20. But see In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Consolidated Subcase 03-10022, (Idaho Dist.
Ct., Nov. 10, 1999) (holding that reserved rights are limited to reservation lands and thus
finding that the Nez Perce Tribe had no water rights appurtenant to its off-reservation
reserved fishing rights). The litigation eventually resulted in a settlement act. See also Snake
River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447,118 Stat. 2809.
21. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
22. See Working Group, supranote 8.
23. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 626-27 (1983); Nevada, 463 U.S. at 135.
24. See Pyramid Lake Paiute v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rincon
Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mut. Water Co., 459 F.2d 1082,1084 (9th Cir. 1972).
25. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476,1482 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
26. See generally Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice's Conflict of
Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307 (2003); see also Judith V.
Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-TribalTrust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in
the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 348-58 (1995) (discussing conflicts
in the context of water resources).
27. These adjudications are designed to resolve all water claims to a stream system,
including tribal and federal claims.
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Indian tribes, but also the interests of federal and public lands that may
conflict with tribal rights.28 Despite the clear competing obligations, and
despite tribal allegations that the federal government has at times
favored federal interests over tribal interests, 29 the Supreme Court held
that, if Congress directs the government to represent both tribal and
competing federal claims to water, the dual representation does not, by
itself, breach the federal trust obligation. 3° The inherent federal conflicts
are difficult for tribes to address. Tribes have been denied relief from
alleged conflicts of interest raised after the fact because of the need for
certainty and finality in water rights adjudications, 3' as well as those
raised during adjudication. 32 Federal courts have held that tribes
concerned about conflicts in federal representation should intervene as
parties in the litigation. 33 Intervention, however, necessitates a waiver of
tribal sovereign immunity and does not ensure that the tribes, rather
than the federal government, control the course of the litigation. 34
Tribes that can show a loss of water rights may recover
substantial monetary damages from the United States. 35 But proving that
the government has failed to obtain all of a tribe's reserved rights, or that
the government has favored non-Indian water rights to the detriment of
tribes, is difficult. 36 The foundational obstacle is that water rights do not
fall neatly into the Court's categories for full enforceable fiduciary
obligations: a comprehensive statutory/regulatory scheme giving the
28. See 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
30. Id. at 143-44.
31. See id.
32. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 784 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating
that the tribe's claim that the United States would understate tribal claims to water "can not
be dismissed as implausible" but could also not be "determined in advance of the fact").
33. Id. at 924-25; see also New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1106 (10th Cir. 1976)
(right to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) if federal government has conflict of interest).
In one case, a tribe was initially denied the right to intervene on the ground that the federal
government was already representing the tribe's interests. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Cmty. v. United States, 684 F.2d 852, 860 n.5 (Cl. Ct. 1982). The tribe was, however,
subsequently granted intervenor status. See United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31
F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994).
34. See Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust
Responsibility,27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 18 (1992).
35. See COHEN, supra note 1, § 19.06, at 1225 n.400 (citing N. Paiute Nation v. United
States, 30 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 210, 215-17 (1973); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. United States,
36 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 256 (1975))
36. See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 29 (1994), affd, 64 F.3d 677
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 660
(1986), affd, 877 F.2d voi
. Cir. 1989); White Mountain Apache Tribe of Ariz. v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614 (1987), affid, 5 F.3d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (opinion published at 20
Indian L. Rep. 2156 (1993)).
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government full control, or a textual source establishing that the
resources are held in trust, along with actual federal control of the
resource.37 In United States v. Navajo Nation, the Court emphasized the
importance of locating the fiduciary duty in specific provisions. 38 And in
the companion case of United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,
Justice Thomas, writing for four justices, argued that an enforceable
fiduciary duty exists only if the duty can be located in a specific textual
provision. 39 Water rights fit uneasily within these categories. In
consequence, Dean Newton has posited that "management of water
rights is best analyzed as falling within the limited trust concept. There is
no scheme imposing comprehensive duties on the Secretary of the
Interior to manage tribal water. In addition, the Government does not
manage tribal water resources on a day-to-day basis, owing in part to the
unique origin of tribal water rights." 4° In breach of trust cases involving
water, then, the greatest difficulty facing Indian tribes may lie in
showing a statutory or regulatory duty that the government has
breached. Even prior to the 2003 Supreme Court trust cases, for example,
the Claims Court had held that the government has no duty to develop
irrigation facilities for tribes 4' or to deliver irrigation water to
42
allotments.
Under some circumstances, the federal government may have
sufficient control over water that enforceable duties arise.43 In Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,44 the court held that, in allocating the excess
waters of the Truckee River between a federal reclamation project and
the reservation, the Secretary of Interior was obligated to fulfill the trust
responsibility to the tribe, not to reconcile competing claims to water.
That level of actual federal control, combined with the federal
government's express recognition of trust responsibilities for tribal water
resources, should be sufficient to satisfy the Court's approach to
enforceable trust duties announced in White Mountain Apache.45

37. See United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 473-75 (2003);
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1983) (Mitchell II).
38. 537 U.S. 488,507-08,511,513 (2003).
39. White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 484-86 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
40. Newton, supra note 12, at 807.
41. White Mountain, 11 Cl. Ct. at 642; Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 201 (1992).
42. Grey, 21 Cl. Ct. at 292.
43. Professor Juliano argues that federal representation of tribes in cases such as water
rights adjudications, with the consequent federal "control" of the litigation, should itself be
sufficient to create enforceable federal fiduciary duties. See Juliano, supra note 26, at 1369.
44. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
45. See White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 474-76.

Spring 2006]

INDIAN WATER AND THE TRUST

The federal government may also have enforceable duties in
those instances where a "special relationship" with respect to water
exists. In one instance, a tribe was able to establish a right to relief based
on the federal government's failure to take action once upstream
diversions interfered with the water supply to the reservation.46 The
claims court held that "the actions taken by the United States in
establishing the reservation in 1859 and in enlarging it thereafter,
together with repeated recognition of the need to preserve or restore the
water supply utilized by the Pimas and Maricopas in maintaining their
commendable self-sufficient status, are consistent only with the existence
of a special relationship between these Indians and the United States
concerning the protection of their lands and the water supply they
utilized on these lands." 47 The existence of a special relationship giving
rise to enforceable fiduciary duties is, however, unlikely to extend to
most tribes.
In some instances, provisions of water settlement acts may create
actual federal control or establish a special relationship sufficient to give
rise to enforceable fiduciary duties. One settlement act expressly
recognizes the Department of the Interior's authority to administer water
rights within the reservation. 48 Two others provide for federal water
management plans.49 Several acts call for the Secretary of the Interior to
administer the tribes' reserved rights pending the development of an
approved tribal water code.50 Given the government's recognition of
tribal water rights as trust assets, these provisions should be sufficient to
establish enforceable fiduciary duties for federal mismanagement of the
water if the Secretary's role under the settlement act constitutes actual
control of the water rights.
46. Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 684 F.2d 852 (0l. Ct.
1982).
47. Id. at 862.
48. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, § 9,
102 Stat. 2973, 2978.
49. An Act relating to the settlement between the United States and the Ak-Chin
Indian community of certain water right claims of such community against the United
States, Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978), as amended, Pub. L. No. 98-530, § 6, 98 Stat.
2698, 2702 (1984) (providing for the establishment of a federal water management plan for
the reservation); San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, § 3710(d), 106 Stat. 4600, 4750 (providing federal water management plan for
reservation).
50. Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 7(b)(3), 118 Stat. 2809,
3435; Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-34, 1
§ 8(b)(1)(F), 117 Stat. 782, 795; Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian
Reserved Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-163, § 102(a), 113 Stat. 1778, 1783; Northern Cheyenne Indian Reserved Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-374, § 5(a), 106 Stat. 1186, 1188.
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II. PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL ACTION CONSISTENT WITH
TRUST PRINCIPLES
Tribal water rights exist in a sort of trust limbo. They are trust
assets due protection from the federal government. But the government
is, in almost all circumstances, under no legal obligation to act and under
no cloud of legal liability if it fails to act.
Congress could create enforceable trust obligations for tribal
water rights by enacting a comprehensive federal management scheme
or placing the Department of the Interior in actual control of tribal water
rights. Neither is likely or desirable. In the area of natural resources,
Congress's recent history consists of restoring ever-increasing control
over those resources to tribes and reducing the federal management role.
Legislation over the last few decades in timber management,51 grazing
and agricultural land use,5 2 and mineral development 3 has expanded
tribal authority to act. The trend continues with the 2005 Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act.54 Under this most
recent statute, tribes may enter into energy resource agreements with the
Department of the Interior.55 Once the Secretary has approved an energy
resource agreement, the tribe may enter into leases and agreements of all
kinds for the development of its energy resources and grant rights of
way for pipelines or electric distribution or transmission lines without
the Secretary's specific approval of each instrument.5 6 Against that
backdrop of increased tribal authority over tribal resources, a new
comprehensive federal scheme for water rights is highly unlikely to be
enacted.
Nor would it be desirable. As matters stand, tribes exercise
considerable control over their water rights, generally determining the
appropriate use for their waters and the circumstances under which
those uses may occur. Although tribes face substantial and welldocumented obstacles in converting their paper water rights into actual
57
or "wet" water and increased federal financial assistance is crucial,

51. National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2000).
52. American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3746
(2000).
53. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2000).
54. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2000).
55. Id. § 3504(e).
56. Id. § 3504(a)(2) & (b).
57. The federal government has traditionally favored irrigation projects that benefit
non-Indians over water projects that benefit tribes. See DANIEL McCOOL, COMMAND OF THE
WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER 13942

(1994).
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actual federal control over Indian water rights would be an unwarranted
interference in tribal authority over tribal resources.
Nonetheless, there are actions that Congress and the Department
of the Interior could take to protect tribal water rights, actions that
would be consistent with and further the federal trust responsibility.
Proposals for such actions -two for the Department of the Interior and
three for Congress -are outlined below. It may be entirely unrealistic to
expect these proposals to result in action, but here they are anyway.
A. Lift the Moratorium on Approval of Tribal Water Codes
There is one simple thing that the Department of the Interior
could do: lift the moratorium on approval of tribal water codes. In 1975,
the Secretary of the Interior mandated that any tribal law that "purports
to regulate the use of water on Indian reservations" should be
automatically disapproved.58 In the 30 years since, the Department of the
Interior has not promulgated rules authorizing review and approval of
tribal water codes. Proposed rules were published twice in the years
soon after the moratorium was imposed, 59 but final rules were never
issued, and the idea has not appeared on the Department's agenda of
rules scheduled for development for 20 years. 60
For many tribes, the moratorium is of little relevance. Tribes that
do not require secretarial approval of their laws are not affected. The
Navajo Nation, for example, which is not subject to a secretarial approval
requirement, 61 adopted a water code in 1984.62 Other tribes may seek
exceptions from the moratorium 63 or build the right to adopt a water
code into a water rights settlement. 64 At least six water rights settlement
acts authorize or require the tribes to adopt water codes,65 and several
58. See Steven J. Shupe, Water in Indian Country: From Paper Rights to a Managed
Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561,579-81 (1986).
59. See Use of Water on Indian Reservations, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,885 (Mar. 17, 1977);
Regulation of Reserved Waters on Indian Reservations, 46 Fed. Reg. 944 (Jan. 5,1981).
60. The item last appeared on the Department's agenda in 1986. See Semiannual
Agenda of Rules Scheduled for Review or Development, 51 Fed. Reg. 38,472, 38,517 (Oct.
27, 1986).
61. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 199 (1985).
62. NAVAjO NATION CODE tit. 22, § 7 (1984).
63. See Shupe, supranote 58, at 581-88.
64. The first water code approved by the Department of the Interior after the 1975
moratorium was the Fort Peck Tribal Water Code, authorized under a 1985 water-rights
compact between the Fort Peck tribes and the State of Montana. See PETER W. SLY,
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETrLEMENT MANUAL 155 (1988).

65. See Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 7(b), 118 Stat. 2809,
3434; Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-34, §
8(b)(1)(F)(i), 117 Stat. 782, 795; Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian
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others provide for federal administration of tribal water rights until the
66
tribe adopts an approved water code.
Nonetheless, for any tribe with a constitution that requires
secretarial approval of tribal laws, the Department's approach raises
serious obstacles to tribal water management. Tribal water codes may set
forth both procedures for obtaining use rights in reserved tribal waters
and the substantive uses to which the water may be put. The ability to
enact a water code is thus a fundamental adjunct to effective tribal use of
reserved water rights and should be facilitated and encouraged by the
federal government, not made more difficult. The water code provisions
built into some water settlement acts benefit the specific tribes covered
by the statutes, but the authority to enact a tribal water code should be
recognized for all tribes. If the Department of the Interior must approve
tribal water codes for those tribes whose constitutions so provide, then
the Department should be willing to review the code of any tribe that
submits one, without the necessity of the tribe's seeking an exception to a
long-outdated moratorium.
B. Define the ESA Baseline to Include All Tribal Rights
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)67 requires the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 68 to determine the biological impacts of any proposed
action "authorized, funded, or carried out" by a federal agency that may
jeopardize a threatened or endangered species or adversely affect critical
habitat. 69 The effects of such an action are assessed against a baseline of
Reserved Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-163, § 102(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1778, 1783; Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-434, § 111(c), 108 Stat. 4526, 4531-4532; Seminole
Water Rights Compact, § II(A)(6), VII(D), reprinted in Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement
Act: Hearings on S. 1684 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 83-122
(1987), incorporatedin Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100228, § 7, 101 Stat. 1556, 1560 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1772e (2000)).
66. Zuni Indian Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-34, §
8(b)(1)(F)(ii), 117 Stat. 782, 796; Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian
Reserved Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-163, § 102(a), 113 Stat. 1778, 1783; Northern Cheyenne Indian Reserved Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-374, § 5(a), 106 Stat. 1186, 1188.
67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
68. Or the National Marine Fisheries Service in the case of anadromous fish or other
species within its jurisdiction.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). This occurs as part of the "section 7 consultation
process" where the agency proposing action "consults" with the Fish and Wildlife Service.
For a brief description of the process, see Cumulative Impacts Under Section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act, 88 I.D. 903, 906-08 (Aug. 27, 1981). In a 1997 secretarial order, the
secretaries of the Interior and Commerce provided that whenever any agencies of their
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existing activities that impact the species or habitat. 70 Although vested
water rights form part of the baseline, relatively few tribal reserved
rights to water are included. Even if tribal water rights have been
recognized in a court decision or settlement act, they do not form part of
the ESA baseline unless the rights are in actual use or there has been
some agency action to develop the water right for which FWS has
prepared a biological opinion. 71 The result is that vested junior nonIndian rights are included in the baseline determinations while senior
tribal rights often are not.
After assessing the biological impacts of a proposed federal
action, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) may issue a "no jeopardy"
biological opinion or a "jeopardy biological opinion" accompanied by
"reasonable and prudent alternatives, if any." 72 The FWS may also
provide non-binding "conservation recommendations." 73 The agency
planning the action may then either forego the action or determine how
to proceed with the action while avoiding or mitigating its impacts. 74 In

departments were proposing actions under the ESA that might impact tribal resources or
rights, "they shall consult with, and seek the participation of, the affected Indian tribes to
the maximum extent practicable." Secretarial Order #3206: American Indian Tribal Rights,
Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered Species Act (June 5, 1997),
see generally Charles
available at http://endangered.fws.gov/tribal/Esatribe.htm;
Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal
Rights-EndangeredSpecies SecretarialOrder,72 WASH. L. REV. 1063, 1063-107 (1997).
70. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006). The definition of "effects of the action" provides that
it:
refers to the direct and indirect effects of an action on the species or critical
habitat, together with the effects of other activities that are interrelated or
interdependent with that action, that will be added to the environmental
baseline. The environmental baseline includes the past and present
impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities
in the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed Federal projects
in the action area that have already undergone formal or early section 7
consultation, and the impact of State or private actions which are
contemporaneous with the consultation in process. Indirect effects are
those that are caused by the proposed action and are later in time, but still
are reasonably certain to occur. Interrelated actions are those that are part
of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.
Interdependent actions are those that have no independent utility apart
from the action under consideration.
Id.
71. See U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Report of the Working Group on the Endangered
Species Act and Indian Water Rights § I1.B (2000) [hereinafter Report of the Working
Group].
72. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2006).
73. See id. § 402.14(j).
74. The agency proposing the action is in theory free to undertake it as proposed
despite a jeopardy opinion, but the action would be subject to challenge as violating section
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making such a determination, baseline uses are protected because the
"jeopardy" is assessed against them. But new or additional uses may be
curtailed or prohibited in order to protect the species or habitat. Where
junior non-Indian water rights are part of the baseline, but senior tribal
rights are not, there is a very real possibility that the senior tribal rights
could be adversely affected or even barred to prevent jeopardy to
protected species or habitat. 75
This possibility contravenes the reserved water rights doctrine
and the federal trust responsibility. One of the fundamental principles of
the tribal reserved rights doctrine is that tribal water rights are not lost
through non-use. 76 This principle derives in part from the fact that the
tribal rights were reserved in perpetuity, and in part from the
recognition that development of tribal water resources had not been a
federal priority. The government's historic preference for funding
reclamation projects that benefited non-Indians while providing little or
no support for tribal projects is well-documented. 77 The principle against
forfeiture for non-use helps counter this federal dereliction and provides
trust protections for reserved, but unexercised, tribal water rights. If the
unexercised tribal water rights do not form part of the ESA baseline,
however, they may be lost or restricted on account of non-use, contrary
to the reserved rights doctrine.
Moreover, tribal reserved rights to water are among the most
senior-often the most senior-water rights on stream systems. 78
Assigning priority dates to tribal water rights is itself an accommodation
to the prior appropriation system of state water rights in western states,
7 of the ESA. See Tim Vollman, The Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 11 NAT.
REsouREcs & ENVT 39,40 (1996).
75. See Report of the Working Group, supra note 71; see also Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian
Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and
Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REv. 381, 426-33 (1998); Vollman, supra note 74, at 42;
Adrian N. Hansen, Note, The Endangered Species Act and Extinction of Reserved Indian Water
Rights on the San Juan River, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1327-29 (1995).
76. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574-78 (1908) (determining that Indian
water rights vest at the date they are created, not when they are put to use); see also Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an Indian
allottee's share of the tribal reserved water right is not lost through non-use).
77.

See, e.g., LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW

22-23 (1991); McCOOL, supra note 57.
78. Tribal reserved rights to water generally carry a priority date of either time
immemorial or the date the reservation was created. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 600 (1963) (finding that the date of the creation of a reservation for water to make
reservations agrarian is then the propriety date); United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414
(9th Cir. 1983) (finding a time immemorial priority for water to support reserved aboriginal
fishing rights). Because reservations were usually established before significant non-Indian
appropriation rights were secured, tribal water rights commonly hold senior positions.
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which is structured upon the first-in-time, first-in-right principle. That
principle, at its core, provides that junior uses - those later in time - can
be restricted or prohibited as necessary to protect senior uses. 79 Thus, as
state-law appropriation rights and tribal reserved rights mesh into a
workable system, junior non-Indian uses must give way, if necessary, to
accommodate the institution of senior tribal rights. The ESA baseline
approach reverses that basic principle and allows the possibility of
severely impinging on senior tribal water rights while allowing junior
non-Indian rights to continue unabated.
In July 2000, the Department of the Interior's Working Group on
the Endangered Species Act and Indian Water Rights issued its final
report and recommendations. 8° The Report noted the conundrum:
The inclusion of Indian water rights in an environmental
baseline may, however, prevent another federal action from
exhausting available water resources, short of jeopardizing
listed species, before the Indian water right is exercised.
The converse fear is that excluding Indian water rights
from a Section 7 baseline may mean that listed species in
the stream system may be taken to the edge of jeopardy
81
before consultation on an Indian project.
To address the problem, the Working Group recommended that
the ESA baseline should include all Indian water rights that had been
decreed in an adjudication, confirmed as part of a settlement act, or
otherwise quantified by act of Congress. 82 Tribal commentators on the
draft recommendations had argued that all Indian water rights,
quantified or not, should be included in the baseline in order to protect
the water rights; most states and non-Indian water users, as well as at
least one member of the Working Group itself, opposed the "more
modest" recommendation made by the Working Group.83 In addition to
its basic recommendation, the Working Group made three other related
recommendations, which some members viewed as complementing the
first and one member viewed as a preferable alternative. 84 These three
79. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976).
80. See Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group on the Endangered
Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,709 (July 6, 2000); Report of the
Working Group, supra note 71; Dep't of the Interior, Working Group on the Endangered
Species Act and Indian Water Rights, Recommendations (2000) [hereinafter Working
Group Recommendations].
81. Report of the Working Group, supranote 71.
82. Working Group Recommendations, supranote 80, Recommendation 2.A.
83. Id. Recommendation 2.A. Explanation.
84. Id.
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recommendations, taken together, provide that, when a senior water
right is the subject of proposed development, the proposal would trigger
reinitiation of the ESA process concerning the existing junior use. "The
purpose of such reinitiation would be to determine if, in light of the
proposed senior project use, the cumulative effects on the listed species
or critical habitat may require modification of the junior project."85 The
Working Group expressly noted that the reinitiation process was
intended to apply to senior Indian water rights that had not formed part
of the initial baseline. 86
Despite its recommendations, the Working Group found a "need
for further public dialogue and comment" before its primary
recommendation on the baseline was implemented. 87 A notice in the
Federal Register in July 2000 solicited further comments, with a deadline
of October 4, 2000, and provided that no action would be taken to
implement the Working Group's recommendations "until all comments
have been received and analyzed." 88 No further action on the
recommendations appears to have taken place since.
The Department of the Interior should revive the Working
Group's recommendations. The ESA environmental baseline should, as
the Working Group recommended, include not just tribal water rights in
use or in actual development, but all tribal rights quantified through
adjudication, settlement, or other act of Congress, whether those rights
are in actual use or not.89 In order to protect senior but unexercised tribal
water rights and fulfill the federal trust responsibility, however, this
should be the minimum requirement. Despite the concerns of the FWS
about including unexercised tribal rights, 9° omitting those rights
prejudices tribes. Omitting rights that have been quantified but are not
yet developed disadvantages tribes with fewer financial resources to
develop their water, and omitting rights that are not yet quantified
injures tribes that are still struggling for recognition of their water rights.
Although including all tribal reserved rights, quantified or not,
in the environmental baseline would best protect those rights, the
Working Group's recommendations may, if properly implemented, offer
a reasonable compromise. The recommendations provide that
proponents of projects that may affect senior water rights, specifically

85. Id. Recommendation 2.B. Explanation.
86. Id. Recommendations 2.B-2.D.
87. Id. Recommendation 2.A. Explanation.
88. Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group on the Endangered
Species Act and Indian Water Rights, 65 Fed. Reg. 41,709 (2000).
89. Working Group Recommendations, Recommendation 2.A.
90. See Report of the Working Group, supra note 71, § 1.B.
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including unquantified tribal rights, should be warned that they assume
the risk that senior rights may be developed and affect the amount of
water available to them.91 When a project involving senior rights,
specifically including Indian rights, is proposed, a reinitiation of the ESA
process would be triggered, 92 and the burden would be on the
proponents of the original project "to demonstrate how their project can
be operated consistent with the ESA, without injuring senior water
rights, including senior Indian water rights." 93 If the reinitiation process
is triggered automatically, and if the burden on the original proponents
is substantial, these recommendations may provide some protection for
unquantified tribal reserved rights. Nonetheless, it is likely unrealistic
that water projects already in development or operation would be shut
down to accommodate later-quantified tribal water rights.
The strongest trust protection for tribal reserved water rights,
and thus the preferable alternative, is for all such water rightsquantified or unquantified, exercised or unexercised- to be included in
the ESA environmental baseline. Failing that, the recommendations of
the Working Group at least provide trust protections for quantified
water rights and a process for possibly protecting later-quantified rights
as they are developed. Despite its flaws, this approach is preferable to
the current one of including in the baseline only those tribal water rights
that are exercised or in development. The Department of the Interior, in
the exercise of its federal trust responsibility for Indian water, should
revise the current definition of the environmental baseline94 to ensure
that tribal reserved rights are included.
C. Amend the McCarran Amendment
Virtually all western states provide for general stream
adjudications designed to determine all rights to water in a particular
stream system. The McCarran Amendment, enacted in 1952, expressly
permits the joinder of the federal government in these state general
stream adjudications. 95 Although the amendment waives the sovereign
immunity of the United States and not the tribes, the Supreme Court has
91. Working Group Recommendations, supra note 80, Recommendation 2.B.
92. Id. Recommendation 2.C.
93. Id. Recommendation 2.D.
94. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006).
95. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000) ("Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant
in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source."). The application of the amendment has been extended to state administrative
proceedings that are subject to judicial review. See United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758,
765-67 (9th Cir. 1994).
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held that the federal government can be joined in a state general stream
adjudication in order to determine tribal reserved rights to water. 96 The
Court subsequently stated that, "although the McCarran Amendment
did not waive the sovereign immunity of Indians as parties to state
comprehensive water adjudications, it did (as we made quite clear in
Colorado River) waive sovereign immunity with regard to the Indian
rights at issue in those proceedings." 97 In a state general stream
adjudication, then, tribes are consequently faced with an uncomfortable
choice: reliance on the federal government to adjudicate tribal rights, or
intervention as parties by waiving their sovereign immunity to suit.
Nothing in the McCarran Amendment divests federal courts of
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian water rights cases. Tribal rights to
water are federal questions, and the Court has been clear that
adjudications of those rights are within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.98 However, the Court also held that federal courts should
generally abstain in favor of state general stream adjudications.99 Despite
this mandate, lower federal courts have sometimes declined to abstain in
particular circumstances: for example, where no state water rights
proceeding was underway, 100 or where the federal court was interpreting
a federal consent decree.'1 1
State courts are obligated to determine tribal rights to water
according to federal law. 102 Not all state courts, however, have been
scrupulous about this duty. 103 Although the Supreme Court has
indicated its willingness to correct abuses through a petition for
certiorari, 1 4 it denied review of the questions presented by the tribal
party in the only state court water rights adjudication that it has

96. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
97. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,566 n.17 (1983).
98. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 808-09.
99. Id. at 817-20; see also San CarlosApache, 463 U.S. at 565-69.
100. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1404-07 (9th Cir. 1983).
101. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 103435 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. San CarlosApache, 463 U.S. at 571.
103. See, e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn III); see generally Stephen M. Feldman, The
Supreme Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment: Toward
Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 433, 444-53 (1994).
Of course, neither have some federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Wash. Dep't of
Ecology, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding that the Lummi Reservation in
the Pacific Northwest was established for domestic and agricultural purposes only; the
holding, however, was limited to groundwater rights).
104. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 812-13.
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considered. 105 Moreover, any problems created by state court
adjudication of tribal water rights may continue beyond the initial
decree, because a state court that issues a general stream adjudication
decree retains jurisdiction to execute, enforce, construe, and interpret
it.106

A fundamental exercise of the trust obligation should be an
amendment to the McCarran Amendment according Indian tribes the
right to bring suit in federal court to assert, or to remove to federal court
from a state general stream adjudication, questions of the scope and
extent of tribal reserved rights to water. If an Indian tribe, or the United
States on behalf of a tribe, initiates suit in federal court to determine
tribal water rights, that suit should stay in federal court unless the tribe
chooses to have the issues determined as part of a general stream
adjudication. Federal courts should no longer have the option to abstain
in favor of state general stream adjudications without the express
consent of the tribal party. Similarly, if the United States is joined in a
general stream adjudication to represent tribal interests, the tribal water
rights issues should be removable to federal court. Removal should be
available at the request of the tribe without the necessity of the tribe
intervening in the state proceeding and therefore waiving its sovereign
immunity from suit in that court. The United States should be authorized
to remove the tribal issues to federal court upon the written request of
the tribe.
D. Create a FOIA "TrustExemption"
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1° 7 mandates that federal
agencies make available certain governmental documents upon a request
from the public. Subject to nine exemptions, agencies must generally
make available their opinions, policies, and other documents not already
published in the Federal Register. 108 Two of the nine exemptions are of
most relevance to Indian tribes: Exemption 4 for "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential" and Exemption 5 for "inter-agency or intra105. See Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), affg without op. by an equally
divided Court, In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn I).
106. See S. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 767 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1985);
Wyoming v. United States, 933 F. Supp. 1030, 1035-36 (D. Wyo. 1996); State Eng'r of Nev. v.
S. Fork Band of the Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050-51 (D. Nev.
2000).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. IV 2004).
108. Id. § 552(a).
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agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to
a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 109 Unless
information supplied by or to an Indian tribe comes within one of
FOIA's exemptions, the Department of the Interior or other federal
agencies acting in their role as trustee can be compelled to disclose that
information to the public. 110
On at least two occasions, one successful, non-Indian parties in
litigation with tribes over water rights have sought to use FOIA to obtain
documents relevant to the tribes' legal theories and analyses of the case.
Both cases involved information provided to the Department of the
Interior in its capacity as trustee to tribes involved in on-going general
stream adjudications.
In the successful case, Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water
Users Protective Ass'n,1m the Department of the Interior filed claims on
behalf of the Klamath Tribes in a state water rights adjudication,
although the Department was apparently not acting as the Tribes'
counsel in the case. 1 2 The Department and the Tribes consulted and
"exchanged written memorandums of the appropriate scope of the
claims" to water. 113 The Klamath Water Users Protective Association,
representing non-Indian water users with claims adverse to the Tribes,
sought access to these and other documents under FOIA.114 The federal
government argued that the documents were protected under
Exemption 5, but the Court held that none of the documents was exempt
and, thus, all the information had to be provided to the adverse party in
the water rights litigation.
The Court expressly rejected the government's argument that its
trust responsibilities to the tribes protected the documents from
disclosure. The Court recognized that the government is the trustee and
had "no doubt" that "the candor of tribal communications with the
Bureau [of Indian Affairs] would be eroded without the protections of
the deliberative process privilege recognized under Exemption 5."115 The
Court also had no doubt that confidentiality "is conducive to a proper

109. Id. § 552(b). Exemption 5 includes materials covered by attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine.
110. See Dep't of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 5-6.
113. Id. at 5.
114. Id. at 6. The other documents were in connection with the Department of the
Interior's development of a plan to manage irrigation water in the Klanath River basin. Id.
at 5.
115. Id. at 11.
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discharge of [the government's] trust obligation."" 6 Moreover, the Court
recognized the Department's argument that "traditional fiduciary
standards forbid a trustee to disclose information acquired as a trustee
when it should know that disclosure would be against the beneficiary's
interests." 117 Nonetheless, the Court held, the information sought did not
fall within a strict reading of Exemption 5 and was therefore subject to
disclosure. 118 It specifically refused to "read an 'Indian trust' exemption
into the statute." 119
In a subsequent case, the district court of Montana distinguished
the Court's decision in Klamath Water Users. In Flathead Joint Board of
Control v. U.S. Department of the Interior, 20 the Joint Board sought

information under FOIA in connection with a general stream
adjudication to which it and the Flathead Tribes were parties. The
information requested was supplied to the government in connection
with the adjudication and the related tribal negotiations with the state of
Montana.' 2 ' The government argued that many of the documents
requested were protected under Exemption 5 or Exemption 4 of FOIA.
Although the Supreme Court found Exemption 5 not applicable to the
documents requested in Klamath Water Users, the Montana district court
ruled that the exemption did generally apply to the information sought
by the Joint Board. The district court noted that the information sought
in FlatheadJoint Board had been generated by the federal agencies, not the
tribes, and that only those documents that the government generated for
its own use and then disseminated to the tribes were subject to
disclosure under FOIA.' 22 In addition, the district court held in favor of
the government on most of its claims of non-disclosure under Exemption
4 for privileged or confidential commercial or financial information. The
court determined that the information requested by the Joint Board
generally fell into this category because water rights are a valuable
property right and an object of commerce. 123
Although the Montana district court was able to distinguish the
requests at issue in FlatheadJoint Board from those in Klamath Water Users,

Indian tribes should not be put in a position to worry about whether
information supplied to the trustee in connection with water rights
adjudications or settlements might be subject to a FOIA request by
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 15.
309 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Mont. 2004).
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1224.
Id.
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opposing parties. The interests so easily dismissed by the Supreme
Court -confidentiality, candor, and the trustee's duty to protect the
beneficiary's interests-are too important to be overridden by an
opposing party's desire for an edge in litigation or negotiation. Indian
tribes must have the ability to exchange legal analysis, theories, and
litigation strategies with the federal trustees who often represent them
without fear of disclosure.
The Court may have refused to read "an 'Indian trust'
exemption" into FOIA,124 but Congress should enact one. At the very
least, the Indian trust exemption should protect information exchanged
between the federal government and an Indian tribe in connection with
or in anticipation of litigation or settlement negotiations. Confidential
commercial or financial information is already protected under
Exemption 4,125 but the same protection should surely extend to legal
theories, analyses, and strategies. The federal trust responsibility must
extend to legal advice and consultation with the beneficiary tribes. If that
federal responsibility is not safeguarded under FOIA's current
exemptions, then it is incumbent on Congress to create a new
exemption-an Indian trust exemption-to protect the legitimate
interests of the Indian tribes and their trustee agencies.
E. Authorize Tribal Water Marketing
Water marketing, generally defined as the sale or lease of water
or water rights to other users, 126 is gaining traction in western
appropriation states.127 Commentators have long advocated the use of
tribal water marketing as a means for tribes to capture the economic
benefit of their water resources; marketing is particularly advantageous
124. Klamath, 532 U.S. at 15.
125. See Flathead,309 F. Supp. 2d at 1221.
126. See Steven J. Shupe, Indian Tribes in the Water Marketing Arena, 15 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 185, 186-93 (1990) (describing water marketing, including a variety of innovative
marketing approaches other than sales or leases). One other alternative to water marketing
is a deferral agreement under which the tribe agrees to forego the use of its water rights in
exchange for payments. See David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water:
From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 546 (1988). A few tribes have entered
into deferral agreements, see id. and Robert H. Abrams, The Big Horn Indian Water Rights
Adjudication:A Battlefor the Legal Imagination, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 71, 74 (1990), but the federal
courts have never ruled on whether such agreements are subject to the strictures of the
Nonintercourse Act. Professor Getches argues that a deferral agreement "effectively
'leases'" the water right and thus should be barred absent congressional consent. This legal
uncertainty surrounding deferral agreements renders them not particularly useful to tribes
seeking to capture the economic benefits of their water rights.
127. See James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A
Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 445-47 (2004).
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if the tribes wish to put their water to consumptive use but are
128
financially unable to develop on-reservation water projects.
An important indicator that water marketing is generally
beneficial to and welcomed by tribes and acceptable to the federal
government is that most of the tribal water settlement acts authorize it in
some form. Although the specifics of the water marketing provisions
vary from act to act,129 the most common factor is the prohibition against
permanent alienation of water rights. Some of the settlement acts
specifically bar any permanent alienation. 130 Others are clear that tribes
may market their water for a limited time period only, 131 and a
significant number of the acts contain specific time limitations on the
lease of tribal water rights. 132 Under most of the water marketing
provisions, marketed tribal water is converted to a state water right
during off-reservation use133 or is otherwise subject to state rules other
than forfeiture for non-use. 134
The prevalence of water marketing provisions in the settlement
acts demonstrates Congress's willingness to consent to the lease or
encumbrance of tribal water rights. To date, however, that legislative
approach has benefited only the few tribes with settlement agreements;
the vast majority of tribes are unable to exercise the same authority.
Nonetheless, the water rights of many of those tribes are presently in use
by non-Indians. Under the prior appropriation regimes of the western
states, any unused tribal water is available for use by junior non-Indian
appropriators until it is claimed by the tribes. The result is that Indian
water is in fact used by non-Indians-for free. Water marketing would
permit tribes to capture the economic benefit of that non-Indian use.
128. See, e.g., Getches, supranote 126, at 541-48; Shupe, supranote 126, at 196.
129. See COHEN, supranote 1, § 19.03[7][c], at 1192.
130. See, e.g., Shivwits Band of the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Water Rights Settlement
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-263, § 7(e), 114 Stat. 737, 742; Chippewa Cree Tribe of the
Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian Reserved Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply
Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-163, § 102(b)(c), 113 Stat. 1778, 1783; Jicarilla
Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-441, § 7(b), 106 Stat.
2237,2239.
131. See, e.g., Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 Title
XXXVII: San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575,
§ 3706(b)(3), 106 Stat. 4600, 4745.
132. The usual time limit specified is 99 or 100 years. See, e.g., San Carlos Apache Tribe
Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3706(b)(3), 106 Stat. 4600, 4745
(100-year maximum, renewable, for certain water); Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights
Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-441, § 7(b), 106 Stat. 2237, 2239 (99-year maximum).
133. See, e.g., Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 Title V:
Ute Indian Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 503(d), 106 Stat. 4600,4652-4653.
134. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-441, § 7(a), 106 Stat. 2237, 2239.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

The primary barrier to tribal water marketing is the
Nonintercourse Act. 135 The Act, which prohibits any "'purchase, grant,
lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto '" 136
without federal consent, likely applies to tribal water rights. Whether
water rights are considered lands137 or interests "associated with land" 138

or simply property rights, 139 they are subject to the constraints of the
Nonintercourse Act. Tribes would thus have no unilateral right to
market their water without federal consent.
Congress may authorize the Secretary of the Interior to exercise
federal consent to the lease or other encumbrance of tribal natural
resources and has done so for virtually all resources other than water.14°
Although Congress has authorized the surface leasing of tribal lands and
the statutory grant appears clearly to include the water rights
appurtenant to the leased land,' 4' Congress has never expressly
authorized the sale or lease of Indian water rights apart from the land.
Without that general statutory authority, neither Indian tribes nor the
142
Secretary appears to have authority to market tribal water rights.

When water marketing is authorized by a water settlement act,
the act generally addresses the role of the Nonintercourse Act. A
significant number of the statutes provide that the Secretary of the
Interior must approve the marketing agreement. 43 On the other hand,
two of the settlement acts state that the Nonintercourse Act does not
135. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000).
136. Id.
137. See North Side Canal Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 12 F.2d 311, 314 (D.Idaho 1926)
(the word "land" is generally construed to include appurtenant waters; the statute at issue
was not Indian legislation).
138. See Shupe, supranote 127, at 197.
139. See Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Decision, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.
481, 489 (1985).
140. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2000).
141. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2000) (authorizing surface leases for a variety of purposes,
"including the development or utilization of natural resources in connection with operation
under such leases").
142. See Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 100 (indicating that tribes had no right to market their
water), affd by an equally divided court, Wyoming, 492 U.S. 938 (1989); United States v.
Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 330 F.2d 897,903 (9th Cir. 1964) (indicating that the Secretary had
no authority to convey tribal water rights even though an earlier decision in the same case
had upheld a secretarial agreement to distribute creek waters between the tribe and nonIndian landowners).
143. See, e.g., Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation Indian Reserved
Water Rights Settlement and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-163,
§ 102(b)(c), 113 Stat. 1778, 1783; Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-441, § 7(c), 106 Stat. 2237, 2239 (1992); Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, Etc.
Title IV: Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-628, § 407(f), 104 Stat. 4469, 4486.
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apply to the water rights subject to the acts,144 apparently freeing the
tribes to engage in water marketing without secretarial approval. A third
approach requires the tribe to submit a water code for secretarial
approval; once the code is approved, the tribe may lease its water
45
through the state water bank without specific federal approval.
Congress should enact a general tribal water marketing statute.
The best model for authorizing legislation may be the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005.146 Under that
statute, tribes may develop energy resource plans and enter into
agreements with the Department of the Interior. Once a tribe has an
approved energy resource agreement, it may enter into energy
development leases and agreements of all kinds without the Secretary's
specific approval of each action. 47 A similar structure could be enacted
for water marketing. Congress could authorize those tribes that wish to
engage in water marketing to submit plans to the Department of the
Interior; once the marketing plans are approved, the tribe would be free
to market its water as it saw fit, without secretarial approval of each
specific transaction.
CONCLUSION
Tribal water resources are trust assets, but largely outside the
usual trust protections. As perhaps the most important tribal resource of
this century, however, these resources deserve significantly more federal
attention and protection than they have so far received. Five proposals to
increase federal trust protection and further the federal trust
responsibility are set out above. The Department of the Interior could lift
its decades-old moratorium on approval of tribal water codes and could
amend the regulatory definition of the environmental baseline under the
Endangered Species Act. Congress could amend the McCarran
Amendment, create a Freedom of Information Act trust exemption, and
authorize tribal water marketing. Each of these actions would help free
tribes to manage their water resources as the tribe chooses and remove
federal impediments to the legal and practical use of tribal water. In an
144. See Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 Title V: Ute
Indian Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 503(b), 106 Stat. 4600, 4652; Colorado
Ute Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-585, § 5(a), 102 Stat. 2973,
2974.
145. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 Division J, Title X: Snake River Water
Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 7 (g)(1), 118 Stat. 2809, 3435 (water leased through
the state water bank is subject to state rules governing other lessors).
146. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2000).
147. Id. § 3504.
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age of government-to-government relations and federal support for
tribal self-determination, the trust doctrine demands no less of the
federal government.

